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A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW:                  
THE INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN IN 
TOXIC TORT CLAIMS AGAINST 
MANUFACTURERS OF CHILDREN’S 
MEDICATIONS 
Susanne L. Flanders∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent removal of many over-the-counter children’s cough 
and cold medications from pharmacy shelves has raised public 
concern about the dangers of children’s medications.1 Many drug 
manufacturers voluntarily withdrew these drugs from the market 
after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommended that 
they not be used in children under the age of six.2 The 
recommendation came after studies showed that in 2004 more than 
1500 infants had experienced “adverse events”3 following their 
ingestion of cold and cough medications,4 and between 1969 and 
2006, more than 120 children aged two and younger had died from 
overdoses and toxicity associated with these drugs.5 Despite these 
                                                           
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2008; B.S., Villanova University, 2002. 
The author would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy. The 
author would also like to thank her friends and family for their love and support. 
1 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Makers Pull Infant Cold Medicines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A18. 
2 Christopher Hollis, Advisory Committees Recommend Against Cough and 
Cold Medications in Children Under 6, DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY, Oct. 22, 2007. 
3 Bob Meadows, Baby Cold Medicine, PEOPLE, Oct. 29, 2007, at 74. 
4 Id. 
5 Debra Sherman, Drugmakers Recall Infant Cough/Cold Medicine, 
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2007. 
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findings, many pharmaceutical manufacturers have continued 
selling their products.6 Furthermore, until a withdrawal is 
mandated, manufacturers will continue to profit from these 
medications while children continue to suffer the harmful 
consequences.7 
Every year, hundreds of thousands of people report to the 
FDA that they have sustained a possible adverse drug reaction.8 In 
fact, adverse reactions to medications are one of the leading causes 
of death in the United States, accounting for more than 100,000 
fatalities yearly.9 Further, it has been suggested that this number 
may be a gross underestimate because more than ninety percent of 
adverse reactions go unreported or undetected.10 
Adverse drug reactions create serious, widespread social 
problems including increased morbidity and mortality rates, longer 
                                                           
6 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Experts Seek Ban on Cold Medicine for Very 
Young, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at A1. 
7 Catherine Larkin, Wyeth, J&J Halt U.S. Sales of Infant Cold Medicines, 
Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aYrOYusxh3jI (“U.S. sales of non-prescription cold remedies for children 
rose [twenty] percent to $311 million in year ended Sept.8 [2007], according to 
market research firm AC Nielson.”). 
8 Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data 
to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2000) (citing 
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., 1998 REPORT TO THE NATION 22 (1998), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rptntn98.pdf.). 
9 Noah, supra note 8, at 449 (citing Denise Grady, Study Says Thousands 
Die from Reaction to Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at A1; U.S. Gen. 
Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/PEMID-90–15, FDA Drug Review: 
Postapproval Risks 1976–85, at 3 (1990); Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of 
Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-analysis of 
Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998); John A. Anderson, Allergic 
Reactions to Drugs and Biological Agents, 268 JAMA 2845, 2845 (1992)). 
10 One reason is that overburdened health care providers often fail to issue 
Adverse Reaction Reports to manufacturers, who in turn, are unable to identify 
when there is a problem with a medication they have produced. See Margaret 
Berger & Aaron Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking 
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 261 (2005) (citing Michael A. Friedman, 
What Is the Value of an FDA Approval in a Judicial Matter?, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 
559, 570 (2004)). 
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hospital stays, and decreased quality of patient care.11 This places 
high financial burdens on both patients and the health care system 
as a whole.12 Perhaps more importantly, it puts the public in 
harm’s way. 
Many of the adverse drug reactions that were reported in the 
past could be traced back to a lack of adequate safety testing that 
resulted in insufficient data about the drugs.13 Of the “230,000 
reports of possible adverse drug reactions” that the FDA receives 
each year, “approximately ten percent of th[em] raise concerns 
about serious reactions that pre-approval clinical trials failed to 
detect.”14 The chairman of Pfizer recently acknowledged that 
clinical trials often fail to reveal problems with the drugs, stating 
“‘You put the drug in the general population, and then everyone is 
taking it . . . .  We just hold our breath and wait to see if there is 
something unique with the drug.’”15 
                                                           
11 David W. Bates et al., The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in 
Hospitalized Patients, 277 JAMA 307, 307, 311 (1997); Noah, supra note 8, at 
450 (citing David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized 
Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 277 
JAMA 301, 301, 305 (1997)). 
12 Bates, supra note 11, at 311; Noah, supra note 8, at 450 (citing David 
C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length 
of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 277 JAMA 301, 301, 305 
(1997)). 
13 See Nathaniel Garrett, Note, “Life is a Risk We Cannot Refuse:” A 
Precautionary Approach to Toxic Risks We Can, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 517, 531 (2005) (“This problem has even been documented by industry, 
such as in a Chemical Manufacturers Association study which noted that 
significant data is lacking in over ninety percent of the high-volume chemicals 
used in United States commerce.”) (citing David Roe, Ready or Not: The 
Coming Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 627–28 (2002)). 
14 Noah, supra note 8, at 452 (citing CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1998 REPORT TO THE 
NATION 22 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rptntn98.pdf.). 
15 Melody Petersen, Unforeseen Side Effects Ruined One Blockbuster, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug 27, 2000, at § 3 (Money and Business/Financial Desk), at 11 
(quoting William C. Steere Jr., the chairman of Pfizer, following the removal of 
its drug, Trovan, from the market). Trovan was a popular antibiotic that was 
prescribed to approximately 300,000 patients a month before it was shown to 
have caused serious side effects including liver toxicity and death. Id. These side 
effects hadn’t been detected in the clinical trials that Pfizer conducted prior to 
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Children’s medications undergo even less safety testing.16 In 
fact, approximately seventy-five percent of medications that are 
prescribed to pediatric populations have only been studied for use 
in adults,17 indicating that any information about the safety and 
efficacy of most pediatric drugs is inadequate or simply absent.18 
As a result, pediatricians and other health care providers are often 
forced to prescribe drugs that lack adequate pediatric dosing 
information and that have not been proven safe and effective for 
use in children.19 Because child-tested drugs rarely exist,20 it is very 
common for physicians, after the FDA has approved a drug for 
adult use, to issue off-label prescriptions to children wherein they 
must use physiological and pharmacokinetic principles from adults 
to make judgments about what dosages and usages of medications 
are safe for children.21 This method, however, is often flawed 
because children vary from adults in many respects, including the 
methods and rates at which they metabolize drugs.22 Further, the 
FDA does not regulate this practice in any manner whatsoever.23 
Children, therefore, are regularly exposed to medications that are, at 
best, ineffective in treating their ailments, and at worse, pose 
                                                           
FDA approval). Id. 
16 See David Wendler et al., Quantifying the Federal Minimum Risk 
Standard, 292 JAMA 826 (2005). 
17 Id. (citing R. Roberts, W. Rodriguez, D. Murphy & T. Crescenzi, 
Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of Pediatric 
Therapies, 290 JAMA 905, 905–11 (2003)). 
18 Peter P. Budetti, Ensuring Safe and Effective Medications for Children, 
290 JAMA 950, 950 (2003) (citing R. Roberts, W. Rodriguez, D. Murphy & 
T. Crescenzi, Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of 
Pediatric Therapies, 290 JAMA 905, 905–11 (2003)). 
19 Id. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 Duane Alexander, Regulation of Research With Children: The Evolution 
From Exclusion to Inclusion, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2002) (“It 
had been amply demonstrated that children were not just small adults, and in 
many instances attempts to extrapolate from adult studies to applications in 
children were folly.”). 
23  Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 (citing Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
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dangerous risks that often result in serious injury and sometimes 
death.24 
Sometimes drug manufacturers make a “willful, strategic 
choice” not to conduct adequate testing.25  For example, “[m]akers 
of . . . Bendectin [and] DES . . . dug in their heels and resisted 
conducting safety research on their products, even when 
preliminary study indicated that the [medications] harmed the 
public.”26 This approach is still common among manufacturers, 
despite instances when they have been held at least partially liable 
for failing to adequately test their products and for the resulting 
harm the products caused.27 
Worse yet, sometimes manufacturers are fully aware of the 
dangers associated with their products, but still keep them on the 
market without adequately warning consumers: 
Numerous industries that have had exclusive information 
about the risk posed by their product have concealed 
information to protect their bottom-line: examples include 
the tobacco industry, which long denied a causal link 
between smoking and disease; the asbestos industry, which 
concealed evidence associating asbestos with lung disease 
                                                           
24 See Wendler et al., supra note 16, at 826 (citing P.H.Y. Caldwell, S.B. 
Murphy, P.H. Butow, & J.C. Craig, Clinical Trials in Children, 364 LANCET 
803, 803–11 (2004)). 
25 Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental 
Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 1619, 1638 (2004). 
26 Id. at 1638–39 (2004) (citing Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: 
A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 321 
(1992) (explaining that Bendectin’s manufacturer, Merrell Dow, faced a great 
deal of claims alleging the product was linked to birth defects because the 
company did not conduct substantial testing before the drug was marketed); 
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982) (DES was a drug that 
was prescribed to help prevent miscarriages. However, the drug was marketed by 
Eli Lilly & Co. before adequate testing had been conducted. It was later 
determined that if the company had properly tested the drug in mice, its 
carcinogenic tendencies would have been detected)). 
27 Wagner, supra note 25, at 1639 (2004) (citing James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate 
Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 779 (1983)). 
FLANDERS FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/3/07 5:16 PM  
310 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
for thirty years; the Industrial Bio-Test (IBT) scandal in 
which a contract toxicology facility that conducted forty 
percent of all United States toxicological testing 
systematically understated cases of cancer in animals in 
laboratory tests of pesticides; and historical concealment by 
the lead, silica and vinyl industries.28 
We now know that corporations involved in the manufacturing of 
many widely used products did not conduct adequate pre-market 
testing, did not disclose information regarding potential harmful 
side effects when the information was ascertained, and chose not to 
conduct additional testing in light of information about adverse 
effects.29 “‘These companies just do it again and again . . . . They 
try to create much larger markets for these drugs than is warranted, 
particularly given what they know about the risks.’”30 
Drug manufacturers’ failure to conduct adequate safety testing 
and disclose known risks persists despite FDA regulation.31 The 
studies that are required by the FDA are often insufficient to 
establish a causal link between a plaintiff’s injury and the 
medication because they don’t account for latent effects, rare 
reactions, population variations, drug interactions, and pre-existing 
susceptibilities to injury.32 Moreover, after the FDA has approved 
a drug, it does not have the authority over drug manufacturers to 
require further research, even when physicians prescribe the drug 
for uses that have not been adequately tested.33 As a result of 
                                                           
28 Garrett, supra note 13, at 559 (2005) (citing WILLIAM LEISS & 
CHRISTINA CHOCIOLKO, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 53 (1994)). 
29 Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a 
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2135 
(1997) (citing PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); PAUL 
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985); MICHAEL D. GREEN, 
BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 96–120 (1996); MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE 
ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST 
IMPLANT CASE (1996); KAREN M. HICKS, SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD 
IUD (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES (1996)). 
30 Alex Berenson, Drug Industry Braces for New Suits Over Even More of 
Its Products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C1. 
31 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2136. 
32 Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 261. 
33 Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 261 (citing Steven R. Salbu, Off-
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budget cuts and policy changes within the agency, the FDA’s 
power to monitor drugs has decreased even further over the past 
decades.34 
Parts I.A and I.B of this Note discuss the history of medication 
testing for pediatric use in the United States, including the ethical 
debate surrounding experimentation in children and the resulting 
financial disincentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part I.C 
focuses on recent developments in the safety regulation of 
children’s medications. Part II.A suggests that the legal tort system 
is a well-suited device for protecting children from unsafe 
medications. Parts II.B and II.C address the causation burden that 
plaintiffs face in toxic tort cases,35 opining that it presents an 
insurmountable burden for children who have been injured and 
bring a subsequent lawsuit. Part III surveys a series of proposals as 
suggested by legal scholars to address this burden. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON CHILDREN’S MEDICATIONS 
A.  The Early Ethical Dilemmas 
In the early twentieth century, there was very little knowledge 
in the United States regarding childhood health and development.36 
Research that was conducted on children, which “sometimes 
included infants, orphans, and wards of the state,” did not receive 
much attention and was not well-regulated.37 For instance, the 
                                                           
Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An 
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1999)). 
34 Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 261. 
35 See generally Craig T. Smith, Peering Into the Microscope: The Rise of 
Judicial Gatekeeping After Daubert And Its Effect on Federal Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 218, 224 (2007) (“A toxic tort, in its 
most general sense, is a physical or psychological harm to an individual due to 
exposure to a chemical factor. Common examples include harm caused by 
asbestos, lead poisoning, and air pollution.”). 
36 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 1. 
37 Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 (“There was some casual concern in the 
United States in the middle of the twentieth century about research that was 
conducted on healthy children, but it didn’t rise to the level of protest that 
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individuals who wrote the Nuremberg Code of 1949, which was 
created after at the end of World War II to set forth principles 
regarding human experimentation, neglected to consider the issues 
surrounding research in children.38 Similarly, the 1964 Declaration 
of Helsinki of the World Medical Association, which gave rise to a 
standard practice of “third party authorization for non-therapeutic 
research,”39 failed to mention children altogether.40 
By the early 1970’s, however, the ethical debate regarding the 
appropriateness of clinical research on children was in full swing,41 
and “informed consent” was at the forefront of the dispute.42 There 
was uncertainty as to what constituted informed consent and the 
extent to which it permitted research on children. In 1971, for 
example, the National Institute of Health published the 
Institutional Guide to the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare Policy on Protection of Human Subjects and required 
either the consent of the individual on whom the research was being 
conducted or the consent of his authorized representative.43  
However, the publication failed to specify exactly what constituted 
informed consent or the circumstances under which it would 
apply.44 Scholars such as Paul Ramsey45 argued, “any non-
therapeutic research on children was absolutely unethical—even 
                                                           
existed in Europe at the time.”). 
38 Alexander, supra note 22, at 1–2 (citing Nuremberg Code, Principle 1 
(1946), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html). 
39 Alexander, supra note 22, at 2. 
40 Alexander, supra note 22, at 2 (citing World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of 
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
(1964), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm). 
41 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 2 (“the existing guidelines [regarding 
research in children] had come under attack from a number of fronts.”). 
42 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 3–7 (discussing the primacy of informed 
consent amidst debates regarding the clinical research on children). 
43 Alexander, supra note 22, at 2. 
44 Alexander, supra note 22, at 2 (citing NIH, The Institutional Guide To 
DHEW Policy on Protection of Human Subjects (Pub. No. 72–102) (1971)). 
45 PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 11–19 (3d ed., 1973) (1970).  
Paul Ramsey is a nationally recognized scholar from Princeton University, who 
is well-regarded for his writings and lectures regarding medical ethics. 
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with parental approval.”46 
The debate caught the eye of the scientific community, 
particularly after it became the subject of several lawsuits. In one 
suit,47 a professor at the University of California in San Francisco 
(the “University”) filed for an injunction because a study 
conducted at the University involved paying families $300 for 
allowing their child to participate in allergy/asthma pharmaceutical 
testing.48 The study proposed to perform invasive medical 
procedures on otherwise healthy children in order to study the 
effects.49 The complaint “asked the court to declare that ‘a parent 
or a guardian of a normal, healthy minor may not subject that child 
to experimental medical procedures not intended to benefit such 
child and that the approval of such conduct by the defendants is 
unconstitutional, invalid, and void.’”50 Although the professor’s 
“application was denied on the grounds that he failed to show 
sufficient standing and irreparable injury to warrant issuance of 
injunctive relief,” his case brought widespread attention to the 
informed consent debate.51 
Another case that examined the limits of parental consent was 
Strunk v. Strunk,52 which centered around a twenty-eight year old 
man who suffered from a fatal kidney disease. His brother, a 
physically healthy twenty-seven year old, had been committed to a 
state institution due to his mental incompetence which rendered 
him the mental equivalent of a six year old. The mother consented 
                                                           
46 Alexander, supra note 22, at 2. 
47 Alexander, supra note 22, at 3 (citing Nielson v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. et al., dismissed, No. 665-049 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, Cal. 1973)). 
48 Alexander, supra note 22, at 3 (citing Letter from Oscar L. Frick, M.D., 
Professor Pediatrics, University of California, San Francisco, School of 
Medicine, Department of Pediatrics To The Committee of Human 
Experimentation, University of California, San Francisco, School of Medicine, 
Department of Pediatrics (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy). 
49 Alexander, supra note 22, at 3. 
50 Alexander, supra note 22, at 3–4 (citing Nielson, No. 665-048 at 13). 
51 Gerald P. Koocher & Patricia C. Keith-Spiegel, Children, Ethics, and 
the Law: Professional Issues and Cases 155 (1990) (original manuscript of out-
of-print work), available at http://www.kspope.com/ethics/Children_Ethics_ 
and_the_Law.pdf. 
52 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). 
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to the removal and transplant of the incompetent brother’s kidney 
into the ailing brother.53 However, the court “held that parental 
control alone was not sufficient for a minor child to serve as a 
kidney . . . donor to a sibling and that court approval was required, 
given that the parents had a conflict of interest and that the donor 
did not stand to benefit from the procedure.”54 The threat of 
further suits like these stifled clinical research on children and 
highlighted the need for clear guidelines in this area of the law.55 
The Federal government became involved in 1977 when “the 
[National] Commission [for Protection of Human Subjects in 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research] issued its report and 
recommendations on research involving children.”56 The 
Commission recommended a change in the terminology associated 
with child research; specifically, that parental “consent” be changed 
to “permission” to reflect the notion that parents lacked the 
authority to unilaterally subject their children to clinical research 
without the child’s assent.57 The Commission also included a 
system that categorized all types of research on children into one 
                                                           
53 Id. at 146. 
54 Alexander, supra note 22, at 2–3. 
55 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 2–4. 
56 Alexander, supra note 22, at 7 (citing NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RESEARCH, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN (DHEW 
Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004) (1977), available at  http://www.bioethics.gov/report/ 
past_commissions/Research_involving_children.pdf). 
57 See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 12–13 (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004) 
(1977), available at  http://www.bioethics.gov/report/past_commissions/ 
Research_involving_children.pdf (stating: 
The Commission uses the term parental or guardian “permission,” 
rather than “consent,” in order to distinguish what a person may do 
autonomously (consent) from what one may do on behalf of another 
(grant permission). Parental permission normally will be required for 
the participation of children in research. In addition, assent of children 
should be required when they are seven years of age or older.  The 
Commission uses the term “assent” rather than “consent” in this 
context, to distinguish a child’s agreement from a legally valid 
consent.). 
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of four risk levels, each of which contained elements of permission 
and/or benefit to the child that had to be satisfied before the 
research could continue.58 It took six years for the Department of 
Health to finish implementing the Commission’s numerous 
recommendations.59 The result was the implementation of 
guidelines aimed at allowing important clinical research to proceed 
while protecting children from exploitation.60 
B.  Financial Disincentives For Safety Testing in Children’s 
Medications 
In addition to the ethical considerations that hamper clinical 
research of children, there are also economic hurdles.61 Because 
“children consume a relatively small proportion of prescription” 
drugs,62 pharmaceutical manufacturers have little incentive to 
conduct clinical studies on children’s medications; rather, their 
efforts are better spent, financially speaking, on testing and 
producing adult medications. Widespread off-label use of adult 
medications in children further decreases the financial incentive for 
manufacturers to conduct child safety testing because they stand to 
profit from pediatric sales of drugs even without such studies.63 As 
a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers, who are often concerned 
about the “bottom line” above all else, are unlikely to conduct 
pediatric testing on the drugs they produce, thereby leaving 
                                                           
58 Alexander, supra note 22, at 9–10 (citing NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RESEARCH, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 7–8, 14 
(Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004) (1977) (“The Society for Research on Child 
Development and a developmental psychologist provided valuable information 
[to the National Committee for Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research] on the ability of children of various ages to make choices 
about participating in research.”). 
59 Alexander, supra note 22, at 10 (citing Additional Protections For 
Children Involved As Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46, 409 (1983)). 
60 Alexander, supra note 22, at 10. 
61 Budetti, supra note 18, at 950 (citing R. Steinbrook, Testing 
Medications in Children, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1462–70 (2002)). 
62 Budetti, supra note 18, at 950. 
63 Budetti, supra note 18, at 950. 
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children vulnerable to dangerous drugs.64 
C.  The Current State of Affairs 
Although things have changed since the days when “the dosage 
was just extrapolated from adult doses, effectiveness and side 
effects were assumed with fingers crossed, and physicians who 
prescribed these drugs for children did so at their own risk,”65 the 
current state of affairs is nonetheless alarming. In 1996, members of 
the American Academy of Pediatrics and the National Institute of 
Health (“NIH”) examined a wide array of clinical studies that the 
NIH had funded during the previous year and found that children 
were often excluded from testing populations in which they could 
have appropriately been included.66 They concluded, therefore, 
that children were not receiving the best possible care.67 
In response to this situation, Congress and the NIH have 
implemented laws and policies intended to increase pediatric 
testing where it is safe and responsible to do so.68 In 1997 and 
2002, for example, Congress passed the Better and Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Acts which extended patent 
protection afforded to drug companies who conducted pediatric 
testing.69 In 1998, the NIH endorsed a policy that required clinical 
investigators to “describe their plans for including children [in 
                                                           
64 See Budetti, supra note 18, at 950. 
65 Alexander, supra note 22, at 11. 
66 Alexander, supra note 22, at 11. 
67 Alexander, supra note 22, at 11 (citing National Institute of Child Health 
& Human Development, Inclusion of Children In Clinical Research Workshop 
(Sept. 5, 1996) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy)). 
68 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 12. 
69 Alexander, supra note 22, at 12 (citing Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–155, 111 Stat. 2305 (1997); Best 
Pharmaceuticals Act for Children of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–109, 115 Stat. 1408 
(2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov); see also Budetti, supra note 18, at 
951 (“Congress has passed two laws to encourage pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to test their products in the pediatric population, relying heavily on the financial 
incentives from extended marketplace exclusivity (delaying introduction of 
generic drugs).”). 
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clinical trials] or justify the exclusion.”70 This policy has increased 
the number of clinical studies in which children are properly 
included.71 
While these measures have achieved some positive results, not 
every effort to increase pediatric testing has been successful. First, 
it is important to remember that ethical considerations often 
preclude manufacturers from including children in clinical trials 
even when legislation encourages them to do so. Additionally, new 
regulations are not always upheld. For example, in 1998, the FDA 
implemented the Pediatric Rule, which empowered the agency to 
“require the testing of new drugs in children.”72 However, in 2002, 
the D.C. Circuit Court73 struck down the rule for “exceeding the 
FDA’s statutory authority.”74 Finally, sometimes the benefits of 
lawful corporate behavior are outweighed by the incentives to 
violate regulatory statutes. In other words, as long as 
pharmaceutical manufacturers stand to lose less money from non-
compliance with new legislation and regulations than they stand to 
gain from the sale of under-tested and potentially hazardous 
pediatric medications, this dangerous practice will continue. As a 
result, additional legal safeguards are necessary to protect children 
from medications that have not been proven safe for pediatric 
use.75 
                                                           
70 Alexander, supra note 22, at 12. 
71 Alexander, supra note 22, at 12. 
72 Alexander, supra note 22, at 12 (citing Regulations Requiring 
Manufacturers to Assess the Safety And Effectiveness of New Drugs and 
Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632 (Dec. 2, 1998) 
(codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 312, 314, 601)). 
73 Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., et al., v. U.S. Food and 
Drug Admin., 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
74 Alexander, supra note 22, at 12; see also Budetti, supra note 18, at 951. 
75 Budetti, supra note 18, at 951. 
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II.  THE TORT SYSTEM 
A.  Using the Tort System to Protect Children From Dangerous 
Medications 
The tort system is one tool that children may turn to for 
protection from toxic drugs. Tort law has been used somewhat 
effectively in the past to deal with manufacturers who have placed 
harmful drugs and medical devises on the market.76 In many of 
those cases, “it appears that the corporations took virtually no 
steps to determine or minimize the possibility of harm until their 
hands were forced, usually by litigation.”77 Once litigation ensued, 
materials uncovered during discovery often revealed “smoking gun” 
documents that demonstrated that the manufacturers knew that 
there were problems with their products before the victims 
suffered injury.78 
The goals of tort law are well-suited to defending children 
against unsafe and inadequately tested medications. Children who 
have been injured as a result of their ingestion of a toxic medication 
can seek to be compensated for their injuries by bringing a tort 
claim against the manufacturer of the drug.79 Such claims, if 
successful, can be used to deter risky or negligent behavior80 on the 
part of manufacturers by making it economically beneficial to take 
measures that reduce the occurrence and severity of toxic 
exposures.81 Successful claims also spread the losses associated 
                                                           
76 Such as in litigation of “Agent Orange, asbestos, Bendectin, breast 
implants, the Dalkon Shield, thalidomide, tobacco, and other substances.” 
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2135. 
77 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2135. 
78 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2135 (citing 
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 99–102, 109–13, 143–44 (1985)). 
79 Anthony Z. Roisman, Martha L. Judy & Daniel Stein, Preserving 
Justice: Defending Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 
193 (2004); see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Product Liability: The New Morass, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1985, § 3, at 1; Garrett, supra note 13, at 536. 
80 Taylor, supra note 79, at 1; see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 536. 
81 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 193. 
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with the ingestion of dangerous medications from the victim to the 
manufacturer, which is both fair and economically efficient.82 
B.  The Plaintiff’s Causation Burden 
Although victims may turn to the courts after they have 
suffered the harmful effects of unsafe medications, the tort system 
does not always provide the protection these individuals need.  
One reason is that there are inherent barriers that plaintiffs must 
overcome in order to bring successful tort claims. Specifically, they 
must not only prove that they suffered an injury, but also must 
prove “cause-in-fact” by a preponderance of the evidence.83 
“Cause-in-fact” usually encompasses two separate elements: 
general causation and specific causation.84 In the context of 
allegedly toxic medications, “plaintiffs have the burden of proving 
that the defendant’s product was capable of causing the health 
effects in question (general causation) and then establishing, in 
addition, that the exposure to the defendant’s product was the 
specific cause of their injury (specific causation).”85 Thus, the 
heavy burden falls on the plaintiff to establish both causation and 
damages.86 
Toxic tort claims turn, and often fail, on the causation issue 
because it is unusual for plaintiffs to be able to provide a “direct 
explanation of a causal process.”87 In other words, a plaintiff often 
                                                           
82 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 535–36. 
83 Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential 
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of 
Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2001) 
(citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
84 Id. 
85 Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: 
The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 297 (2001) (citing In re Joint E. 
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
86 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 553. 
87 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2120–21 
(1997) (citing Mario J. Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals to Causation, 
Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397, 403 
(1987) (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT 
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does not know, and therefore cannot explain, the precise biological 
mechanism by which the medication they ingested produced their 
injuries, despite evidence that the causal relationship exists. While 
scientific experts88 may be able to speculate about the way in 
which the medication allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injury, that 
plaintiff will fail to prove causation if he is armed with nothing 
more than mere speculation. 
In an effort to formulate an opinion based on more than mere 
speculation, a plaintiff’s expert witness may rely upon several 
different kinds of evidence. Four common types of scientific 
studies used are: 1) structure-activity analyses, 2) animal 
bioassays, 3) in vitro studies, and 4) case reports/series. In 
structure-activity analyses, also called chemical-structure analyses, 
scientists examine substances that have a similar chemical structure 
to the medication the plaintiff claims caused their injury in order to 
determine if those substances have been associated with adverse 
health reactions.89 If so, the expert can draw inferences about the 
medication that is the subject of the litigation.90 Animal bioassays 
                                                           
LITIGATION 148 (1995) (Judge Weinstein observed that “causation is the 
central, decisive factor in mass tort litigation.”))). 
88 In most toxic tort actions, plaintiffs often employ causation experts “who 
seek to link exposure and injury in order to establish both general and specific 
causation.”  See Laurie Alberts, Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Which 
Way Do We Go, Judge?,” 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 40 (2001) (citing M. Neil 
Browne, Terri J. Keeley & Wesley J. Heirs, The Epistemological Role of 
Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, n.19 (Fall 1998)). An 
expert witness is “one, who, by training, education, or experience, has acquired 
a special level of skill or knowledge in some art, science, profession, or calling.” 
Alberts, supra note 88, at 39–40 (citing Hon. Mark I. Bernstein, Expert 
Testimony in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 699 n.2 (1995)).  “Since 
causation is often the central issue in toxic tort claims, the success or failure of 
the case may well hinge on the expert testimony.”  Alberts, supra note 88, at 40 
(citing Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, 25 
No. 4 A.B.A. J. SEC. LITIG. 6 (Summer 1999)). 
89 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 298–99; see also 
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123; Alberts, supra 
note 88, at 52  (discussing the use of pharmacological studies). 
90 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 298–99; see also 
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123; Alberts, supra 
note 88, at 52  (discussing the use of pharmacological studies). 
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(or “in vivo” studies) are toxicological studies that utilize carefully 
controlled experimental conditions to determine the effects of the 
medication on laboratory animals.91 Experts use these studies to 
draw inferences about the effect of these medications on humans.92 
In vitro studies examine the effects of the medication “on living 
cells, bacteria, body organs, or animal embryos . . . in isolation from 
the rest of the organism,”93 providing a basis for experts to further 
extrapolate the impact the medication may have on an entire 
organism.94 Finally, case reports and series are uncontrolled 
observational studies that follow an individual or series of 
individuals who have been exposed to the medication, taking into 
account factors such as gender and age.95 Experts then use this 
information to draw conclusions about the general effects of the 
medication.96 
Although it is common for scientists to rely upon the results of 
these various types of studies,97 reliance by toxic tort experts is 
                                                           
91 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124. 
Using results of adverse reactions in animals to prove causation in 
humans requires at least two assumptions: first, that if a substance is 
toxic in animals it will also be toxic in humans, a conclusion that is 
known not always to be true, and second, that humans will suffer an 
adverse effect from a low dose of a substance, even though laboratory 
animals are given much higher and more constant dosages so as to 
induce a measurable reaction.  
Id.; see also In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 2003 
WL22417238, at *18–19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003). 
92 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124. 
93 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123–24. 
94 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123–24. 
95 See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 2003 
WL22417238, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003). 
96 Id. 
97 See, e.g., id. at *17 (“In many scientific disciplines, the use of case 
reports is longstanding, as evidenced by the continued publication of such 
reports in peer-reviewed scientific journals.”); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic 
Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 
YALE L.J. 376, 394 (1986) (“Inferences from animal and in vitro studies . . . are 
widely supported by regulators and scientists.”); Berger, Upsetting the Balance, 
supra note 85, at 298–99; In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 
264, 2003 WL22417238, at *18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003) 
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controversial because the studies contain substantial 
uncertainties.98 For instance, structure-activity analysis “is 
probative [of the toxicity of the accused drug] only if the adverse 
reaction [from the chemical that was studied] . . . is due to an 
attribute the substances have in common, rather than one that sets 
[the two chemicals] apart.”99 Thus, if scientists have not identified 
how the substance in the study caused the adverse reaction, it 
cannot be said with any certainty that it was caused by an attribute 
the substance has in common with the accused medication, and the 
structure-activity analysis has no probative value.100 The concern 
with in vivo studies is that they may attempt to oversimplify the 
human body by extrapolating from animals.101 Similarly, because in 
vitro research is conducted on cells that are isolated from the rest of 
the organism, scientists do not know if the substance would react 
the same way when exposed to the body as a whole.102 Lastly, case 
studies are often criticized because they do not control for outside 
variables103 such as pre-existing health conditions; therefore, 
experts cannot say with certainty that an adverse reaction was 
caused by the accused medication and not the outside variables. 
Although the aforementioned types of studies may not provide 
a legally adequate basis for an expert opinion on causation, 
epidemiological studies are generally viewed as the best proof of 
general causation.104 Epidemiologists examine human 
                                                           
(“Toxicological research often provides the best scientific evidence about the 
risk of a disease from chemical exposure and the metabolic, cellular, and other 
physiological effects of chemical exposure . . . .”). 
98 See Gold, supra note 97, at 394. 
99 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123. 
100 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123 (citing 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 27-1.3.1, at 263 n.26 (1997)). 
101 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124 (citing 
Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing 
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1811 n.58 (1989)). 
102 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123–24. 
103 See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 2003 
WL22417238, at *27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003). 
104 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2125; see 
also Alberts, supra note 88, at 49 (“With respect to the establishment of 
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populations105 to ascertain the causes of health problems in those 
populations.106 More specifically, when studying the effects of an 
accused medication, an epidemiological study compares a 
population of people who have been exposed to the drug with an 
unexposed population to determine whether associations can be 
made between the drug and its effects.107 When epidemiological 
studies show correlations between exposure and adverse reactions, 
these associations are considered credible evidence of causation in 
the toxic tort setting.108 
                                                           
causation in toxic tort litigation, this science is aimed at proving general, as 
opposed to specific, causation.”). 
105 Garrett, supra note 13, at 524 (citing Dinah Shelton, The Impact of 
Scientific Uncertainty on Environmental Law and Policy in the United States, 
in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 209–210 
(David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996)); Alberts, supra note 88, at 49; 
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2125; Gold, supra 
note 97, at 379. 
106 Alberts, supra note 88, at 49 (citing Christopher H. Buckley Jr. & 
Charley H. Haake, Separating the Scientist’s Wheat from the Charlatan’s 
Chaff: Daubert’s Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10293 
(June 1998)). See also Douglas L. Weed, Causation: An Epidemiologic 
Perspective (In Five Parts), 12 J.L. & POL’Y 43, 44 (2003) (“Epidemiology is 
the study of the distributions and [causal] determinants of disease in populations 
and the application of this study to control health problems.”). 
107 Gold, supra note 97, at 380 (citing Devin Brennan, Book Note, 30 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 565 (2006) (reviewing CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC 
TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (2006)). See also 
Garrett, supra note 13, at 528 (stating: 
The gold standard of epidemiological studies is a randomized, placebo-
controlled double blind study where a sample population is exposed to 
an agent within a controlled environment and then compared to a group 
that has unwittingly been given a placebo. Neither the physician nor 
the patient knows which members of the trial are exposed to the real 
agent in hopes of isolating and determining the effects of a given agent 
to the greatest possible extent.). 
108 Gold, supra note 97, at 380 (citing Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, 
Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 
762–64 (1984)). 
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C.  Causation in Child Toxic Tort Cases: An Insurmountable 
Burden 
1.  The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert Standard 
Given the varying degree of credibility attributed to different 
types of scientific studies, judges face a difficult task when 
determining whether to admit expert opinions based on such 
studies.109 The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), which were 
enacted in 1975, provided some guidance on the issue. Specifically, 
FRE 702 created a standard of expert opinion admissibility that 
was based on a notion of reliability,110 and FRE 703 provided that 
experts may base their opinions on “the kind of information on 
which similar experts would rely in making non-litigation-oriented 
professional judgments.”111 These rules gave federal judges 
direction when determining the admissibility of expert testimony 
based on scientific evidence. 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,112 the United States 
Supreme Court elaborated upon the requirements of FRE 702.113 
The petitioners in that case were children who claimed their 
                                                           
109 See Alberts, supra note 88, at 40. 
110 Alberts, supra note 88, at 43 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). FED. R. EVID. 702, as originally enacted, read: “If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule 
was amended on December 1, 2000. 
111 Evidence Law News, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/EL00003_4.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2007 (stating that “under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the emphasis shifted, 
away from the admissibility of the facts upon which an expert’s opinion was 
based, to the reliability of these facts as determined by the profession in arriving 
at professional judgments independent of litigation.”). 
112 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
113 See Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Healthy Policy, and 
Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 89, 111 (2005); see 
also Alberts, supra note 88, at 43. 
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mothers’ ingestion of the drug Bendectin caused their birth 
defects.114 They offered experts who opined that there was a causal 
relationship between the drug and the defects based on several 
types of studies including “animal studies, chemical structure 
analysis and unpublished reanalysis of previously published 
human studies.”115 The Court “explicitly anointed the trial judge as 
the ‘gatekeeper’”116 who must ensure that “an expert’s testimony 
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”117 
The Court advised that the judge should examine the reasoning and 
methodology that underlies the testimony of the expert in order to 
determine its reliability.118 The Court also offered some “‘general 
observations’ in order to ‘help’ federal judges determine whether a 
particular scientific theory or technique is ‘scientific knowledge 
that will assist the trier of fact.’”119 
The Daubert factors, which focus primarily on reliability 
are: 1) whether the theory or technique can be used or has 
been tested; 2) whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication; 3) whether the 
theory or technique has been “generally accepted” within 
the scientific community; 4) whether a potential rate of 
error exists in cases involving particular scientific 
techniques; and 5) whether standards which control the 
technique’s operation exist and were maintained.120 
The Daubert test is widely viewed as a flexible approach because 
                                                           
114 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582. 
115 Garrett, supra note 13, at 526 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583–84). 
116 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 293 (citing Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 589); see also Klass, supra note 113, at 111 (“In order to allow 
expert, scientific testimony to be presented at trial, the trial judge must 
determine at the outset whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology 
properly can be applied to the facts.”); Berger, Eliminating General Causation, 
supra note 29, at 2122. 
117 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra 
note 85, at 293 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589); see also Klass, supra note 
113, at 111; Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2122. 
118 Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 135. 
119 Alberts, supra note 88, at 44 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). 
120 Alberts, supra note 88, at 44 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). 
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no single factor is dispositive of evidentiary reliability,121 not all 
factors are applicable in all cases,122 and some factors may take on 
more importance than others in appropriate circumstances.123 
Further, the Court’s emphasis on the trial judge as gatekeeper 
“appear[ed] to liberalize admissibility requirements”124 by giving 
the judge a high level of discretion in determining whether scientific 
evidence and testimony is based on reliable methodology.125 Under 
Daubert, a judge should admit evidence so long as he determines 
that it is reliable and useful to the jury.126 
In 2000, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence amended FRE 702 to reflect its endorsement of the 
Daubert standard.127 However, while the amendment was intended 
to be consistent with the Daubert holding, its language was more 
restrictive than Daubert in terms of the rules for the admissibility 
of scientific evidence.128 Specifically, the amended FRE 702 
                                                           
121 Steven B. Loomis, The Daubert Test of Reliability: Fighting “Junk 
Science in the Courtrooms,” SKEPTIC REPORT, Nov. 2002, http://www. 
skepticreport.com/skepticism/dauberttest.htm (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–
93). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Garrett, supra note 13, at 526 (citing Joseph Sanders et al., Legal 
Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
139, 142 (2002)). 
125 Garrett, supra note 13, at 526 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592) (citing 
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 
IN AMERICA 58 (Harvard 1995) (stating: “The judge does this through a voir 
dire examination, and on the basis of questions asked by counsel for both parties 
‘the trial judge forms an initial opinion of the expert’s claim to specialized 
knowledge and determines whether the witness should be admitted or not.’”). 
126 Garrett, supra note 13, at 526–27 (citing Stephen Charest, Bayesian 
Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
265, 280 (2002)). 
127 Forensic Evidence.com, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/EL00003_4.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2007). 
128 David Bernstein, Daubert and Amended FRE 702, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY, Nov. 3, 2005, http://volokh.com/posts/1131073785.shtml. The 
current FED. R. EVID. 702 provides that an expert may issue an expert opinion 
in a case if that opinion will assist the trier of fact and “if (1) the testimony is 
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requires that the proponent of the evidence not only convince the 
trial judge that it is sufficiently reliable, but must also demonstrate 
that the testifying expert has applied the evidence reliably to the 
particular facts in the case.129 This restriction is indicative of an 
overall trend of a tightening of the Daubert standard. 
2.  The Epidemiology Requirement 
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert, and 
subsequent federal decisions130 provide some direction for federal 
judges regarding the admissibly of scientific evidence, they are not 
bright-line standards.131 Trial judges, therefore, have a great deal of 
discretion when carrying out their role as evidentiary gate-
keepers.132 This has opened the door for many courts to take a 
narrow interpretation of the seemingly liberal language of the 
Daubert decision.133 
One manifestation of this narrow approach to Daubert is that 
the tort system has become partial to epidemiological studies134 to 
establish causation in toxic tort cases. This epidemiological 
                                                           
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. 
129 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
130 See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999); 
General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
131 Alberts, supra note 88, at 46 (citing Confronting the New Challenges 
of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1556–57 (1996)). 
132 Alberts, supra note 88, at 46 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). 
133 Carolyn Raffensperger & Nancy Myers, Detox For Torts: How to Bring 
Justice Back to the Court System, SCI. & ENVTL. HEALTH NETWORK, July 
2003, at 8, available at http://www.sehn.org/rtfdocs/white-paper.doc; Garrett, 
supra note 13, at 527 (stating: 
This inconsistency is partially due to the fact that the decision 
symbolized more than its words suggested. Hidden behind the Court’s 
decision lay the unspoken objective of finding a new rule that would 
keep so-called ‘junk science’ out of the courtroom. Daubert’s emphasis 
on reliability and the role of the judge as gatekeeper served as a 
message to lower courts to take admissibility requirements seriously.). 
134 Garrett, supra note 13, at 528. 
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preference may have originated with “the general judicial backlash 
against ‘junk science’135 and more specifically to Judge Jack 
Weinstein’s highly influential” Agent Orange decision in 1985.136 
In that decision, Judge Weinstein found that epidemiological 
studies were “the only useful studies having any bearing on 
causation” because non-epidemiological studies “rest on surmise 
and inapposite extrapolation.”137 
Some judges have followed suit by entirely rejecting non-
epidemiological evidence because they find it irrelevant to causation 
issues in humans.138 For instance, some courts have refused to 
                                                           
135 This term refers to scientific evidence that is flawed in its methodology 
or is for some other reason misleading or inaccurate. See, e.g., Joelle Anne 
Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans That 
Divide Science and Law With Justice Breyer At the Helm, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 1033, 
1091 n.18 (2001) (stating: 
Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same 
form but none of the same substance. There is the astronomer, on the 
one hand, and the astrologist, on the other . . . . [Junk science] is a 
hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference, and logical legerdemain, 
patched together by researchers whose enthusiasm for discovery and 
diagnosis far outstrips their skill. It is a catalog of every conceivable 
kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, 
and, now and then, outright fraud.). 
136 Garrett, supra note 13, at 528–29 (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 
1987)). In In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., the plaintiffs consisted of 
veterans and their families who claimed to suffer from various injuries as a result 
of exposure to a chemical called “Agent Orange” which was used in Vietnam as 
an herbicide. The plaintiffs sued the makers of the chemical. The court, however, 
held that the opinions of the experts put forth by the plaintiffs were inadmissible 
because they lacked the requisite reliability and the complaints were dismissed. 
Id. 
137 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124 (citing 
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
138 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 8; see also In re 
Phenylpropanolamine, 2003 WL22417238, at *12 (“[S]ome courts have held 
that animal studies are not a valid basis for extrapolating conclusions about 
human disease causation.”); Alberts, supra note 88, at 51–52 (“[Animal 
studies] are of so little probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be 
inadmissible.”); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
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consider animal studies on the grounds that laboratory animals may 
react differently to medications than humans.139 However, this is 
contrary to FRE 703 which permits experts to testify about their 
opinions when they are based upon the same types of studies 
relied upon by their colleagues when making non-litigation 
professional judgments.140 It is also contrary to Daubert because 
Daubert included “general acceptance within the scientific 
community” as one of its factors for determining reliability.141 
Since scientists regularly use non-epidemiological studies to assess 
whether particular substances pose a human risk,142 this type of 
evidence does “hold some utility in helping to establish causality in 
toxic tort cases.”143 The absolute exclusion of non-epidemiological 
evidence is overly restrictive and omits “vast areas of scientific 
knowledge and . . . many legitimate tools of investigation.”144 
When judges exclude non-epidemiological evidence, they 
                                                           
2002) (citing Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (stating: 
[C]ase reports are not reliable scientific evidence of causation, because 
they simply described reported phenomena without comparison to the 
rate at which the phenomena occur in the general population or in a 
defined control group; do not isolate and exclude potentially alternative 
causes; and do not investigate or explain the mechanism of causation). 
139 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 302 n.81 (quoting 
Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1480 (D.V.I. 
1994)). 
140 Forensic Evidence.com, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/EL00003_4.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2007) (stating that “under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the emphasis shifted, 
away from the admissibility of the facts upon which an expert’s opinion was 
based, to the reliability of these facts as determined by the profession in arriving 
at professional judgments independent of litigation.”). 
141 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
142 Alberts, supra note 88, at 51–52 (citing Casey, 877 F. Supp. at 1385); 
see also In re Phenylpropanolamine, 2003 WL 22417238, at *29; see also 
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 4 (“Scientists themselves rely on 
animal studies, models, systematic field observations, and even causal 
observations as sources of knowledge—but ‘sound science’ advocates tend to 
discredit such knowledge.”). 
143 Garrett, supra note 13, at 531. 
144 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 4. 
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unilaterally increase the plaintiff’s causation burden by requiring 
that each piece of evidence not only be reliable, as required under 
the Daubert standard, but also that plaintiff’s experts be able “to 
demonstrate before trial that each study relied upon can on its own 
prove the plaintiff’s case.”145 Since many types of studies cannot 
meet this elevated burden, critical pieces of evidence are often 
excluded. As a result, many plaintiffs with legitimate claims are 
unable to proceed with their cases because they are left with little 
or no evidence.146 Further, even if they are able to proceed, they are 
prejudiced because juries are left to render verdicts without having 
the opportunity to consider all of the relevant evidence.147 
Another problem plaintiffs face is that even when 
epidemiological data is available, the data is not always adequate 
proof that it is “more likely than not” that the medication can cause 
the type of injury that he or she has sustained.148 Many courts 
require that an epidemiological study show a relative risk ratio149 of 
                                                           
145 Klass, supra note 113, at 112. 
146 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 205–06 (citing PROJECT ON 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUB. POL’Y, DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL 
SUPREME COURT RULING YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 3 (Tellus Institute June 
2003), available at http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/Daubert-The-Most- 
Influential-Supreme-Court-Decision-You-ve-Never-Heard-Of-2003.pdf); see also 
Garrett, supra note 13, at 519 (stating: 
Causal mechanisms for toxic torts are notoriously complex, and 
because toxins cannot be directly tested on humans for obvious ethical 
reasons, even epidemiological studies are often unable to conclusively 
determine the effects of a suspected toxin . . . Because epidemiological 
data are frequently inconclusive, imprecise, or unavailable for newly-
developed toxins, the tort system’s single-minded faith in 
epidemiology prevents victims of toxic torts from recovering even when 
they have a legitimate claim.). 
147 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 7; see also Garrett, supra 
note 13, at 531 (“[P]laintiffs are unfairly prejudiced by the tort system’s 
reluctance to allow animal studies, in vitro studies, chemical structure analysis, 
and case reports.”). 
148 Alberts, supra note 88, at 50 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 
Corp., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
149 See generally Smith, supra note 35, at 236 (stating: 
Relative risk is commonly calculated by dividing the risk of 
developing a disease observed in an exposed group by the risk observed 
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at least 2.0 to be considered sufficiently significant to meet the 
“more likely than not” burden.150 In other words, the study must 
show that the risk of injury was at least twice as high for 
individuals who ingested the medication.151 Even if a study showed 
that the ingestion of a particular medication resulted in a 99% 
increased risk of a particular injury, it would not satisfy this 
admissibility standard152 and would be excluded in the Daubert 
hearing.153 Therefore, this bright-line standard may preclude the 
                                                           
in an unexposed, but otherwise similar group. If the risks of the 
unexposed and exposed are the same, then the relative risk estimate is 
1.0. . . . Thus a relative risk of 1.0 means that the agent has no effect 
on the incidence of disease. Similarly, if the relative risk estimate is 
1.3, then risk appears to be 30% higher among the exposed compared 
to the non-exposed. When the relative risk reaches 2.0, the risk has 
doubled, indicating that the risk is twice as high among the exposed 
group as compared to the non-exposed group.). 
150 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 8; Alberts, supra note 88, at 
50 (“Although on remand the Ninth Circuit in Daubert held that a relative risk 
ratio of greater than two is not an absolute prerequisite when establishing 
causation, courts have generally disallowed evidence that does not meet this 
standard.”); see also Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 
2126 (stating: 
The strength of the association is typically expressed by 
epidemiologists in terms of relative risk. A relative risk of 1.0 indicates 
no observed difference between the groups being compared. A relative 
risk over 1.0 is not, however, an irrefutable indicator of causation. As 
an abstract proposition, unless the ratio is at least 2.0, no plaintiff will 
be able to prove that his or her disease was more likely than not 
attributable to the defendant’s product.). 
151 Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 111 (citing In re Joint E. & 
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); rev’d on 
other grounds, 964 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958–59 (3d Cir. 1990); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 
N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1992)). 
152 Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 111. 
153 Alberts, supra note 88, at 50, 54; see also David L. Faigman, Maping 
the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 568 (1995) (“In 
deciding whether to admit scientific evidence into court, judges confront the 
same possibilities of error as scientists. The trial court makes what might be 
termed a type I error when it admits scientific evidence that is invalid; and it 
makes a type II error when it excludes evidence that is valid.”). 
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admissibility of important evidence that, when viewed in light of all 
the evidence, is probative of causation.154 
Epidemiological studies may also fall short of meeting the 
plaintiff’s causation burden because they are uncontrolled studies 
that are “notoriously subject to confounders and bias.”155 Some 
epidemiological studies have been criticized for failing to be 
“gender, race or class neutral.”156 Critics also point out that the 
medication “may not have been tested in interaction with other 
substances, tested on a representative sample of the population, or 
had its effects tracked over time.”157 Further, epidemiological 
studies may underestimate the risk associated with a drug because 
they “favor . . . false negatives (a test result wrongly showing a risk 
not to be present when it is) rather than false positive (a test result 
wrongfully showing a risk to be present when it is not).”158 As a 
result of these shortcomings, the studies may either be inadmissible 
at trial or may be useless in helping the plaintiff conclusively prove 
causation.159 
Evidentiary restrictions are particularly prejudicial to child-
plaintiffs alleging injuries as a result of their ingestion of unsafe 
medications because children’s medications are often inadequately 
tested.160 Thus, epidemiological studies focusing upon children’s 
                                                           
154 See Alan Golansky, General Causation At a Crossroads in Toxic Tort 
Cases, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 479, 488–96 (2003). 
155 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 5. 
156 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 304 (citing Lucinda 
M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using 
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 335, 374 (1999)). 
157 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 303–04 (citing 
Petersen, supra note 15, at 11; Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastonmond, 
Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort 
Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 5 (2001). 
158 Garrett, supra note 13, at 519 (citing Lars Persson & Kristin Shrader-
Frechette, An Evaluation of the Ethical Principles of the ICRP’s Radiation 
Protection Standards for Workers, 80 HEALTH PHYSICS 225, 228 (2001)). 
159 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 5. 
160 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 530 (“With suspected toxins, moral 
concerns preclude conducting controlled tests on human subjects.”). 
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medications frequently do not exist at all.161 Further, even when 
epidemiological studies on medications that are administered to 
children have been conducted, children are rarely included in the 
study population.162 As a result, the admissibility of the evidence 
is called into question because the subjects of the study did not 
have the same physical characteristics as the plaintiff, and therefore 
“even less scientific evidence on exposure levels and effect is 
available.”163 
As a result of Daubert and subsequent decisions regarding the 
admissibility of expert testimony, “the federal courts ha[ve] made 
it very difficult for a plaintiff to successfully prosecute a toxic tort 
case.”164 While science tends “to be very conservative in reaching 
conclusions on cause and effect and to err on the side of showing 
no effects when there may indeed be effects,” courts take the 
Daubert mandate too far, putting forth unrealistic, “overly 
stringent and specific scientific standards” that plaintiffs simply 
cannot meet with the scientific evidence that is available.165 If a 
defendant in a toxic tort case is successful in having the plaintiff’s 
evidence excluded in a pre-trial Daubert hearing, the plaintiff will 
be unable to prove causation—“a crucial element of the plaintiff’s 
case.”166 Before the case has even gone to trial, it will end in 
summary judgment, which “means the end of the case for the 
plaintiff.”167 
The plaintiffs in Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp. were unable to 
overcome the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.168 In 
                                                           
161 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 530. 
162 Klass, supra note 113, at 110 (citing JOHN WARGO, OUT CHILDREN’S 
TOXIC LEGACY: HOW SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM 
PESTICIDES 177–78 (1996)). 
163 Klass, supra note 113, at 110. 
164 Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 260. 
165 Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 260. 
166 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 290. 
167 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 8 (emphasis in original); see 
also Alberts, supra note 88, at 40–41. 
168 Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(Plaintiffs claimed that a drug they had used to suppress lactation after giving 
birthParlodelhad caused them to suffer hemorrhagic strokes). 
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Rider, the plaintiffs’ experts relied primarily on case reports of 
other individuals who had suffered similar injuries after ingesting 
the drug in order to provide a causal link between the drug and the 
injury.169 Since there was no epidemiological evidence, the court 
had to determine whether the plaintiffs had presented sufficient 
causation evidence to meet Daubert requirements.170 In finding the 
case report evidence insufficient to establish causation, the court 
demonstrated its distrust of the evidence and noted that case 
reports “reflect only reported data, not scientific methodology.”171 
Further, despite pointing out that, generally speaking, a lack of 
epidemiological evidence “is not fatal to a plaintiff’s case,”172 the 
court found that the case reports provided only “anecdotal 
support” and were not enough to overcome the lack of 
epidemiological evidence in this case.173 Therefore, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.174 
Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. is a more recent example of 
the preclusive effect of a narrow Daubert interpretation.175 The 
                                                           
169 Id. at 1199. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 1198. 
173 Id. at 1199 (“Some case reports do contain details of the treatment and 
differential diagnosis. Even these more detailed case reports, however, are not 
reliable enough, by themselves, to demonstrate the causal link the plaintiffs 
assert that they do because they report symptoms observed in a single patient in 
an uncontrolled context.”). 
174 Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d at 1195–96 (citing Rosen v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996)) (reasoning that: 
In the absence of epidemiology, plaintiffs may still prove medical 
causation by other evidence. In the instant case, however, plaintiffs 
simply have not provided reliable evidence to support their 
conclusions. To admit the plaintiffs’ evidence, the Court would have to 
make several scientifically unsupported “leaps of faith” in the causal 
chain. The Daubert rule requires more. Given time, information, and 
resources, courts may only admit the state of science as it is. Courts are 
cautioned not to admit speculation, conjecture, or inference that cannot 
be supported by sound scientific principles. “The courtroom is not the 
place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags 
science; it does not lead it.”). 
175 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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plaintiff in Norris claimed that her silicone breast implants had 
caused her to experience a systemic allergic reaction.176 The 
plaintiff’s expert relied on case studies that “showed a correlation 
between women with breast implants and the development of 
systemic disease.”177 However, the Tenth Circuit held that the case 
studies “did not provide an adequate scientific basis from which to 
conclude that breast implants in fact cause disease”178 and 
“emphasiz[ed] the district court’s finding that epidemiological 
evidence is the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort 
case.”179 Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment.180 
Children with toxic tort claims are adversely affected by narrow 
interpretations of the Daubert decision. For instance, in 1998 and 
1999 the Eighth Circuit heard two cases involving plaintiffs who 
claimed that their birth defects resulted from their mothers’ 
pesticide exposure during pregnancy.181 The plaintiffs’ experts 
                                                           
176 Id. at 880 (stating: 
Beginning in 1987, Plaintiff began to suffer from a variety of ailments 
including pain in her right shoulder and foot and pain and swelling in 
her right knee, hip, and other joints. On October 23, 1989, Plaintiff had 
both implants removed because her doctor believed that she had 
silicone-induced lupus. The diagnosis was subsequently changed by 
Dr. Vasey, one of Plaintiff’s proffered experts, to silicone-associated 
connective tissue disease-autoimmune disease caused by silicone which 
leaked from breast implants. This disease allegedly caused Plaintiff to 
suffer tenderness in the muscles of her mid and low back in addition to 
joint swelling in her upper extremities.). 
177 Nina Adatia, Recent Developments in Health Law: Select Recent Court 
Decisions: Expert Testimony: Experts Must Address Negative Epidemiology to 
Survive Summary Judgment in Products Liability Cases Involving Silicone 
Breast Implants—Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 
2005), 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 384, 385 (2005) (citing Norris, 397 F.3d at 885). 
178 Adatia, supra note 177, at 385. 
179 Id. (citing Norris, 397 F.3d at 882); but see Adatia, supra note 177, at 
386 (“The Tenth Circuit emphasized that epidemiological evidence is not 
always required to establish causation in toxic tort liability suits.”). 
180 Adatia, supra note 177, at 386.  
181 Klass, supra note 113, at 112–13 (citing Nat’l Bank of Commerce, of 
El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(stating:  
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relied upon scholarly articles, studies conducted by the 
manufacturer, letters from the manufacturer to the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and animal studies.182 However, the experts 
were unable to point to any epidemiological evidence which 
“consistently and repeatedly demonstrate[ed] any statistical 
association between the exposure of pregnant women to Dursban 
[the pesticide] and any increase in human birth defect” in their 
children.183 As a result, the court of appeals found in both cases 
that the plaintiffs could not meet the scientific evidentiary 
requirements of Daubert, and therefore, could not go forward with 
the litigation.184 
                                                           
Jerry and Patricia Arnold had problems with roaches and other 
household insects. To eliminate the problem, they allegedly purchased 
and applied three pesticides . . . [which they] contend they were 
using . . . when their son and daughter-in-law, Michael and Debra 
Arnold, moved into their home in December of 1992. Around the time 
they moved in, Debra Arnold became pregnant with Matthew Arnold 
who was born September 7, 1993. The use of pesticides allegedly 
continued throughout the early stages of Debra Arnold’s pregnancy, 
that is until April 1, 1993. When Matthew Arnold was born, he 
suffered from multiple birth defects. The Arnolds filed this action in 
federal district court alleging negligence, products liability, and breach 
of warranty claims.); 
Nat’l Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 133 F.3d 
1132, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), aff’d 965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 
1996) (“Ashley Smits was born with severe birth defects. During her pregnancy, 
Ashley’s mother had been exposed to Dursban LO (a pesticide) and Firefog 404 
(a reoderant). Plaintiffs filed suit against various defendants contending that these 
chemical agents, either singly or in combination, were the cause of Ashley’s 
abnormalities.”). 
182 Klass, supra note 113, at 113. 
183 Klass, supra note 113, at 113 (quoting Nat’l Bank of Commerce, of El 
Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1528 (E.D. Ark. 1996)). 
184 Klass, supra note 113, at 112–13; but see Klass, supra note 113, at 116 
(In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court in Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours 
& Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1270 (Fla. 2003) “held that human epidemiological 
studies were not necessary in this case because pesticide exposure of this kind 
was rare to begin with, and it would be unethical to expose humans to a 
substance known to cause birth defects in animals for testing purposes.”); $95 
Million Award to 8-Year-Old Boy in Lawsuit on Drug, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
1987, at A25 (discussing a 1987 case in which an eight year old boy received a 
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Children who brought claims against the manufacturers of cold 
medications containing Phenylpropanolamine faced similar 
evidentiary problems. Those plaintiffs claimed they suffered 
adverse reactions, including strokes and cardiac arrest, from the 
ingestion of Phenylpropanolamine (“PPA”), an ingredient that was 
in many children’s cough and cold medications.185 PPA was 
removed from the market in 2000 after the FDA concluded that 
there was an association between PPA ingestion and hemorrhagic 
strokes.186 The primary piece of evidence that led the FDA to this 
conclusion was the Yale Study—a five-year epidemiological study 
which found a “link between [PPA] and hemorrhagic stroke.”187 
The $5 million study was funded by the Consumer Healthcare 
Products Association (the nonprescription drug industry’s trade 
group),188 and “looked at 702 men and women . . . who had been 
hospitalized with hemorrhagic strokes, characterized by bleeding in 
the brain.”189  
                                                           
$95 million jury verdict after using animal test results to establish a causal 
connection between Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug used during pregnancy, and 
his birth defects). 
185 Drugs Containing PPA, USA TODAY, November 7, 2000, at 3B 
(Some children’s medications that contained Phenylpropanolamine included 
Triaminic DM Cough Relief, Triaminic Expectorant Chest and Head 
Congestion, Triaminic Syrup Cold and Allergy, and Triaminic Triaminicol 
Cold & Cough); see also Sheryl Stolberg, Ingredient in Popular Medicines in 
Linked to Strokes, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), October 20, 2000, at 1A 
(“Phenylpropanolamine, or PPA, had been used for more than [fifty] years, 
primarily in nonprescription cold and cough remedies as well as in appetite 
suppressants and some prescription decongestants. Dozens of products contain 
PPA, including some intended for children; the food and drug agency said 6 
billion doses were sold [in 1999] alone.”). 
186 Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A (“In recommending that the ingredient 
be banned from over-the-counter drugs, the [Food and Drug Administration’s] 
staff ha[d] already concluded that phenylpropanolamine [wa]s responsible for 
between 200 to 500 strokes each year in people aged [eighteen] to [forty-nine], 
primarily women and first time users of the drug.”). 
187 Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A. 
188 Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A. 
189 Leigh Hopper, Area Pharmacies Pull Medications After FDA’s Alert, 
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 8, 2000, at A41; see Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A 
(After the results of the study were released, “scientists who spoke on behalf of 
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Because the Yale Study did not include any children, defendant 
manufacturers argued that the results of the study were not 
applicable to children and could not be used to prove general 
causation in that population.190 Since this was the only 
epidemiological study that had been conducted to look at the 
effects of PPA, child plaintiffs faced a significant hurdle in proving 
general causation. 
3.  The Goals of Tort Law Are Not Being Achieved 
A rigid judicial approach to the admission of causation evidence 
fails to serve many of the purposes of tort law, including “adequate 
compensation, deterrence, and loss spreading.”191 Children who 
have suffered injuries at the hands of manufacturers that have 
produced unsafe medications are not adequately compensated 
because the judicial system requires the victims to “produce 
evidence from nonexistent information.”192 As we have seen, the 
type of evidence that would satisfy the strict evidentiary standards 
that many courts have imposed following the Daubert line of cases 
simply does not exist in most of these cases because most 
children’s medications are not sufficiently tested on children, 
thereby perpetuating the dearth of admissible evidence for child-
plaintiffs. “[T]he more stringently trial courts insist on 
epidemiological studies, . . . the more likely the . . . plaintiff[s] will 
be to lose.”193 
                                                           
the nonprescription drug industry . . . insisted the . . . study, which was paid 
for by their own trade group,” was “‘a failed study’ because it ‘contained too 
few patients to be statistically significant and that the strokes occurring in people 
taking phenylpropanolamine could have been caused by other factors, such as 
drug and alcohol abuse.’”). 
190 See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability 
Litigation, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“Defendants . . . 
focus on the parameters and results of the [Yale Study], arguing that the study 
lacks reliability as to certain ‘sub-populations,’ including men, individuals 
below age eighteen and above age forty-nine, and individuals suffering strokes 
more than three days after ingestion of PPA.”). 
191 Garrett, supra note 13, at 553. 
192 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14. 
193 Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 304. 
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Excessively strict evidentiary standards also inhibit tort law’s 
deterrence objective. Manufacturers will continue to put children’s 
medications on the shelves despite a lack of adequate testing 
because they know that they will benefit from doing so: if 
manufacturers do not conduct epidemiological testing, plaintiffs’ 
claims will be dismissed because they will not have adequate 
evidence to meet their causation burden.194 In this way, a “[l]ack of 
data is actually protective of defendants in these circumstances.  
They are better off not knowing the risk posed by their products. 
If they test and litigation begins, they will have to turn over testing 
results during discovery.”195 Further, even when manufacturers do 
conduct safety testing, narrow evidentiary standards create a 
disincentive for them to disclose the findings if they are not 
favorable.196 In this way, “the current system actually protects 
manufacturers who ignore or conceal evidence of toxicity”197 rather 
than encouraging them to take responsible measures to minimize 
the risks to their consumers. 
The tort system’s goal of loss spreading198 is also inhibited by 
                                                           
194 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14. 
195 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14; see also Berger, 
Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2134 (“Current law 
encourages corporations to engage in ostrich-like behavior that keeps them from 
knowing or investigating risk, because the future likelihood that a causal 
connection can be proved between the corporation’s conduct and plaintiffs’ 
injury appears minimal compared to the cost of present compliance.”); Wagner, 
supra note 25, at 1636–37 (“[A]ctors benefit from knowing nothing, in part 
because it deprives plaintiffs of the evidence that they need to bring their case.”). 
196 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2119 n.8 
(stating: 
The emerging field of toxic torts is characterized by its lack of 
information for decision making, and not by its ability to generate 
data . . . . [T]he industrial defendant is typically in the best position to 
create the necessary data, but its incentives are the reverse. In the 
absence of dramatic changes to encourage defendants to generate and 
disclose potentially inculpatory toxicity evidence, tort law is unlikely 
to be a major factor in creating toxics data.). 
197 Garrett, supra note 13, at 520. 
198 See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 57, 68 (David Patterson ed., 
Blackwell Publ’g, 1996).  
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an overly restrictive application of the Daubert standard. The goal 
would be better served by a system that holds manufacturers, 
“who generally possess the most knowledge about the agent and 
the greatest resources for further research,”199 financially 
responsible for the injuries that result from their defective 
products, rather than placing the financial burden of the injury on 
the victims. However, the current system often does the opposite 
by shielding manufacturers from liability through stringent 
evidentiary standards, while “the burden of proof is heavily 
skewed toward plaintiffs.”200 Thus, the victims bear the financial 
burdens of dealing with the sometimes catastrophic injuries that 
children suffer following their ingestion of unsafe medications, 
while large drug manufacturers continue to profit. 
Finally, “[t]he causation model is . . . inconsistent with notions 
of moral responsibility underlying tort law.”201 In addition to 
encouraging manufacturers to avoid behavior that could make their 
products safer, courts fail to reward manufacturers when they take 
steps to act responsibly.202 As Professor Margaret Berger has 
noted, “a system that encourages a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy 
decouples liability from moral responsibility and thus threatens the 
basic underpinnings of corrective justice.”203 
III.  PROPOSALS 
A.  New Legislation 
Some legal scholars suggest that reformers should concentrate 
less on causation issues and more on creating incentives for drug 
manufacturers to “keep [themselves] reasonably informed about 
the risks of [their] products.”204 Further, commentators have called 
                                                           
199 Garrett, supra note 13, at 520. 
200 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14. 
201 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2117. 
202 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2117. 
203 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14. 
204 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14. 
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for manufacturers to share such information with the consumer.205 
One way to accomplish this goal would be to “[reform] tort law by 
creating a new cause of action, sounding in negligence, under which 
manufacturers could be held liable for ‘failure to provide substantial 
information relating to risk.’”206 This proposal would ease 
plaintiffs’ causation burden because it would focus on the conduct 
of the manufacturer and would not “[require] proof that such 
failure ‘caused [the] plaintiff’s injury.’”207 Professor Margaret 
Berger has endorsed the creation of this “new toxic tort,” stating 
that “[i]f a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level of due 
care, it should be held liable to those put at risk by its action.”208 
Another proposal attempts to address the lack of 
epidemiological evidence, calling for the legislature to enact a law 
under which manufacturers of children’s medications would be 
required to contribute to an independent scientific research fund.209 
The fund would then be used “to conduct comprehensive 
retrospective exposure analyses and epidemiologic studies of all the 
populations which have been exposed.”210 In theory, this approach 
would help diminish the incentives that the current causation 
scheme creates for drug manufacturers “not to know and not to 
disclose” the risks associated with their products.211 However, 
because of the ethical, legal, and practical difficulties associated 
with the testing of medications in adolescent populations, such a 
law may prove infeasible. 
                                                           
205 Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65, 83 (2006). 
206 Brennan, supra note 107, at 572 (quoting Berger, Eliminating General 
Causation, supra note 29, at 2143).  
207 Brennan, supra note 107, at 572 (quoting Berger, Eliminating General 
Causation, supra note 29, at 2143). 
208 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14 (quoting Berger, 
Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2134). 
209 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 224. 
210 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 224. 
211 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2119. 
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B.  A Broader Range of Admissible Evidence 
Other proposals focus on the variety of scientific research and 
evidence that courts can and should admit in toxic tort cases.212 
Plaintiffs would be permitted to introduce the types of evidence 
that scientists routinely rely upon to prove causation “such as 
animal studies, in vitro studies, chemical structure analysis, [and] 
case reports,”213  thereby diminishing the epidemiological evidence 
requirement that many courts have adopted with respect to 
causation issues. This policy would be consistent with FRE 703, 
which allows evidence to be introduced when it is the type of 
evidence upon which scientists regularly rely. It would be also be 
consistent with the courts’ opinions in Ferebee v. Chevron 
Chemical Co.214 and Wells v. Ortho.Corp.,215 recognizing that 
                                                           
212 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 97, at 393–94. 
213 Garrett, supra note 13, at 528–29. 
214 736 F.2d 1529, 1531–32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating:  
Ferebee, an agricultural worker at the Beltsville Agricultural Research 
Center (BARC), an installation of the United States Department of 
Agriculture located in Beltsville, Maryland, allegedly contracted 
pulmonary fibrosis as a result of long-term skin exposure to dilute 
solutions of paraquat, a herbicide distributed in the United States solely 
by Chevron. When Ferebee died before trial, his estate continued with a 
survival action and a wrongful death count was added on behalf of his 
minor children.). 
215 788 F.2d 741, 742–43 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating: 
Katie Laurel Wells was born on July 1, 1981 with birth defects 
including deformity of her right hand, the complete lack of a left arm 
with only partial development of her left clavicle and shoulder, a cleft 
lip, and nostril deformity. A later diagnosis showed that she also has 
an optic nerve defect in her right eye. The plaintiffs alleged that these 
birth defects were caused by a spermicidal jelly used by the mother for 
approximately four weeks after conception until she discovered that she 
was pregnant. The spermicidal jelly used by Mary Maihafer, in 
conjunction with a diaphragm, was manufactured and marketed without 
a prescription by Ortho. Called Ortho-Gynol Contraceptive Jelly 
(“Ortho-Gynol”), this vaginal spermicide has as its active ingredient a 
non-ionic surfactant known as Octoxynol-9. The Ortho-Gynol label and 
package insert in 1980 contained only this warning—the spermicide 
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“scientists ought to be allowed to testify even when 
epidemiological studies do not exist ‘as long as the basic 
methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound.’”216  
Finally, it would comport with Justice Stevens’s view that 
“Daubert was intended to allow a ‘weight of the evidence’ 
approach that considers all available scientific evidence, as opposed 
to a threshold approach that demands epidemiological studies.”217 
This policy would have many advantages over the current 
approach taken by many courts, as it would acknowledge the 
“subtlety, complexity, strengths, and weakness of different kinds 
of scientific evidence—and not . . . overly simpl[ify] [the] rules for 
admitting or barring available evidence.”218 Such a shift in policy 
would also stay true to the nature of the adversarial process by 
allowing jurors to evaluate evidence that is currently being excluded 
by judges in pre-trial Daubert hearings, thus leaving “fact-finders 
free to decide which of the many inferences urged on them are 
reasonable.”219 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this 
approach would help to counteract the current state of affairs in 
which children who have been injured by unsafe medications are 
unable to recover damages because epidemiological evidence is 
either inapplicable or unavailable and the scientific evidence that is 
                                                           
might cause irritation to the female or male genitalia, is not 100 percent 
effective, and should be kept out of the reach of children. Plaintiffs 
brought suit against Ortho alleging that Ortho-Gynol caused Katie 
Wells’ birth defects, that Ortho negligently failed to warn that its 
spermicide could cause serious birth defects, and that Ortho’s failure to 
warn proximately caused the birth defects. Plaintiffs sought damages for 
Katie Wells’ pain and suffering, medical expenses and disability, as 
well as Mary Maihafer’s emotional distress and lost wages.). 
216 Garrett, supra note 13, at 555 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535–36). 
217 Garrett, supra note 13, at 555 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153). 
218 Garrett, supra note 13, at 532 (quoting Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric 
Information, The Precautionary Principle, and Burdens of Proof, in 
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 74, 89, 555 (1999) (“[S]cientific methodologies 
like animal studies, chemical structure analyses, in vitro analyses, and case 
studies can serve as reliable scientific evidence to establish causation.”). 
219 Gold, supra note 97, at 394. 
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available is deemed inadmissible.220 
C.  Lower Causation Burden 
In order to deal with the seemingly “insurmountable” causation 
burden that plaintiffs face when epidemiological evidence is 
unavailable, some scholars/critics suggest that the courts “[allow] 
the plaintiff to proceed with relatively less evidence than would be 
required if there were a substantial body of [evidence].”221 This is 
the approach that the courts took in both Heller v. Shaw Indus.222 
and Zuchowicz v. United States.223 Plaintiffs’ experts would “be 
                                                           
220 See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 
2003 WL22417238, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003). 
221 Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 131; but see id. at 132 
(“Here, as in other areas of causal uncertainty, we are left with the question of 
how far the courts should go in easing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”). 
222 167 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (“This is an appeal by plaintiff Carol 
Heller (“Heller”), who sought to recover from defendant Shaw Industries 
(“Shaw”), for certain respiratory illnesses allegedly caused by volatile organic 
compounds emitted by Shaw carpet installed in Heller’s former home.”). 
223 140 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating: 
This suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 
2671-2680, was originally filed by Patricia Zuchowicz, who claimed to 
have developed primary pulmonary hypertension, a fatal lung 
condition, as a result of the defendant’s negligence in prescribing an 
overdose of the drug Danocrine. Following Mrs. Zuchowicz’s death in 
1991, her husband, Steven, continued the case on behalf of his wife’s 
estate, claiming that the defendant was responsible for her death.). 
See also Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 131; James v. Bessemer 
Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 300 (1998) (“In our toxic-tort precedents, this 
Court has tried to strike a balance with regard to proof of causation that is fair to 
both plaintiffs and defendants in view of the almost certain lack of direct 
scientific proof in such cases.”); but see Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 
83, at 131–32 (stating: 
However, courts have not been willing to . . . adopt the proposals of 
some commentators argue that, in situations of irreducible causal 
uncertainty, the plaintiff should either be relieved of the burden of 
persuasion on the causal question or should be permitted some 
percentage recovery, as long as the plaintiff could establish strong 
uncertainty about causation.). 
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permitted to render an opinion on general causation with little or no 
epidemiological evidence and sometimes with very little 
toxicological evidence.”224 It would then be up to the trier of fact to 
determine what weight to give the experts’ opinions. As a result, 
fewer plaintiffs’ cases would be dismissed on summary judgment 
and more victims of dangerous medical products would receive the 
compensation they deserve—or at least a fair review of their case. 
D.  Burden-Shifting 
Another proposal that has received a great deal of attention 
from the scholarly community would “[shift] the burden of proof 
regarding general causation to defendants.”225 In this causation 
scheme, plaintiffs would still bear the initial burden of presenting a 
prima facie case. First, the plaintiffs would have to prove that they 
ingested the manufacturer’s medication. Next, they would have to 
show that the defendant sold an inadequately tested medication by 
“pointing to specific testing or data collection for evidence not 
already available through other means that the manufacturer could 
have conducted.”226 After the prima facie case had been proven, 
however, the burden would then shift to the defendants to disprove 
general causation and specific causation.227 In this way, “it would 
                                                           
224 Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 131 (citing Lakie v. 
Smithkline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D.D.C. 1997)). 
225 Brennan, supra note 107, at 573; see also Klass, supra note 113, at 134 
(discussing burden-shifting in the context of toxic tort cases that involve 
chemicals that have been released into the environment). 
226 Klass, supra note 113, at 134, 136. 
227 Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2144–45; see 
also Garrett, supra note 13, at 556; Brennan, supra note 107, at 573.  To 
disprove general causation, defendants would have to prove that the type of 
adverse reaction claimed by the plaintiff is not associated with the defendant’s 
medication. See Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 
2144–45; see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 556; Brennan, supra note 107, at 
573. To disprove specific causation, defendants would have to prove that the 
specific injury that the plaintiff suffered was not caused by the medication, but 
rather by some alternative cause.  See Berger, Eliminating General Causation, 
supra note 29, at 2144–45; see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 556; Brennan, 
supra note 107, at 573. 
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be the defendant manufacturer, not the plaintiff, who would bear 
the burden of scientific uncertainty,” because a lack of scientific 
evidence would signify an inability to disprove causation.228 
Burden shifting was first discussed in 1944 by Justice Roger 
Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.229 Justice Traynor 
noted that because “‘the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards 
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot,’ 
the tort system was justified in shifting to the defendant the burden 
of proving that it had taken proper care to avoid the alleged 
harm.”230 He further commented that “public policy demands that 
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the 
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach 
the market.”231 More recently, many states have shifted the burden 
in cases involving inadequate safety testing from the defendant to 
the plaintiff, thereby resulting in compensation for the victim.232 
The burden-shifting doctrine has the potential to “restore the 
basic moral underpinnings to the law.”233 The implementation of 
burden-shifting principles could serve the tort system’s retributive 
purposes by holding manufacturers responsible for subjecting 
consumers to the risk of injury.234 In Summers v. Tice,235 the 
                                                           
228 Klass, supra note 113, at 134 (citing Lynda M. Collins, Strange 
Bedfellows? The Precautionary Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort Paradigm for 
the 21st Century, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,361, 10,370 (2005)). 
229 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
230 Garrett, supra note 13, at 535 (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41). 
231 Garrett, supra note 13, at 535. 
232 Klass, supra note 113, at 143. 
233 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14 (“A corporation ought to 
exercise a responsible level of due care and be held liable to those who have been 
put in harm’s way by its action without regard to the actual harm. As Berger 
says, a corporation should be culpable if it has acted without taking into account 
the interests of those who will be affected by its conduct.”). 
234 Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14. 
235 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (stating: 
Plaintiff’s action was against both defendants for an injury to his right 
eye and face as the result of being struck by bird shot discharged from a 
shotgun. The case was tried by the court without a jury and the court 
found that on November 20, 1945, plaintiff and the two defendants were 
hunting quail on the open range. Each of the defendants was armed with 
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“court . . . reasoned that if determining causation . . . was difficult,  
. . . ‘the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right 
to redress,’ and ‘the wrongdoers are not in a position to complain 
of uncertainty.’”236 Further, it is morally just for “those who stand 
to profit from the product” to be left “with the responsibility of 
demonstrating with a high level of confidence that harm will not 
occur.”237 
Burden-shifting spreads the costs of injuries resulting from 
dangerous medications by placing the cost on the manufacturers 
who produced them because they are in the best position to 
“conduct the studies, to balance the cost of studies against the 
potential cost of tort suits, and to distribute those costs.”238 The 
court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories239 agreed, concluding that 
“as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the 
                                                           
a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with shells containing 7 1/2 size shot. Prior 
to going hunting plaintiff discussed the hunting procedure with 
defendants, indicating that they were to exercise care when shooting and 
to “keep in line.” In the course of hunting plaintiff proceeded up a hill, 
thus placing the hunters at the points of a triangle. The view of 
defendants with reference to plaintiff was unobstructed and they knew 
his location. Defendant Tice flushed a quail which rose in flight to a 
10-foot elevation and flew between plaintiff and defendants. Both 
defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff’s direction. At that 
time defendants were 75 yards from plaintiff. One shot struck plaintiff in 
his eye and another in his upper lip. Finally it was found by the court 
that as the direct result of the shooting by defendants the shots struck 
plaintiff as above mentioned and that defendants were negligent in so 
shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.). 
236 Klass, supra note 113, at 140 (quoting Summers, 199 P.2d at 5). 
237 Garrett, supra note 13, at 520 (citing David Freestone, International 
Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Continued Rise of the Precautionary Principle, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PAST 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 135, 135 (Alan Boye et al. eds., 
1999). 
238 Brennan, supra note 107, at 573; see also Taylor, supra note 79, at 1 
(“the cost of injuries involving dangerous products should be borne by the 
manufacturers, who are in the best position to minimize the risks and to spread 
the cost through insurance.”)  
239 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (Plaintiffs were the children of women 
who had ingested DES during their pregnancy and alleged that the chemical 
resulted in injuries including a malignant bladder tumor). 
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latter should bear the cost of the injury and that ‘from a broader 
policy standpoint,’ defendants were better able to bear the cost of 
injury resulting from the creation of a defective product.”240 Under 
the current scheme, victims are often unsuccessful in bringing a 
claim against the defendant manufacturer, and therefore bear the 
entire costs of injury, including litigation fees, which can be 
financially devastating.241 However with a burden-shifting 
framework, defendant manufacturers would be able to spread the 
associated costs of production, testing, and litigation defense to 
their insurance carriers,242 consumers, and stockholders,, and “the 
financial effect on each individual [would] likely [be] small.”243 
Finally, shifting the causation burden to the manufacturers of 
dangerous medications would also deter dangerous behavior.244 The 
increased liability that pharmaceutical manufacturers would face 
would be an incentive to take steps to avoid litigation in the first 
instance.245 Drug companies would be more likely to conduct 
adequate safety testing on children’s medications and to disclose 
the results of that testing in an effort to disprove causation should 
litigation occur.246 If, on the other hand, safety testing is not 
feasible, manufacturers may be deterred from placing their product 
on the market altogether.247 In this way, pharmaceutical 
                                                           
240 Klass, supra note 113, at 141–42 (citing Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936). 
241 Garrett, supra note 13, at 558. 
242 Taylor, supra note 79, at 1. 
243 Garrett, supra note 13, at 558 (citing Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the 
Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer’s Critique of 
Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 732 (1995)). 
244 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 225. 
245 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 225; see also Taylor, supra 
note 79, at 1 (“If injuries caused by dangerous products become a cost of doing 
business for a producer . . . there will be an incentive to make safer products to 
avoid liability.”). 
246 See Brennan, supra note 107, at 573; see also Klass, supra note 113, at 
135–37 (discussing the effect of burden shifting on pesticide manufacturers); 
Garrett, supra note 13, at 559 (“The precautionary principle . . . encourag[es] 
defendants to expose, not conceal, science so that they may escape liability by 
showing that they are not to blame.”). 
247 Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 217. (“If the real cost of 
producing . . . a substance or product is so high when properly allocated that no 
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manufacturers, who “have superior knowledge or access to 
knowledge about the[ir] product,”248 would be “force[d] . . . to 
fully take the costs of children’s health into account in analyzing 
which products to place on the market and to conduct the scientific 
studies necessary to ensure their safety.”249 Burden-shifting would 
then deter manufacturers from gambling with the lives of their 
customers and protect children from harm not only after injuries 
have been sustained, but more importantly, before injuries ever 
occur.250 
E.  A Recognized Right To Make An Informed Choice 
Ethical concerns about children’s ability to give informed 
consent for involvement in clinical testing are one of the main 
reasons for the lack of safety testing on children’s medications.251 
This concern, however, is seemingly ignored once medications are 
on the shelf because inadequate safety information and nonexistent 
warnings deprive consumers “of the right to choose whether they 
wish to subject themselves to the material risk of . . . harm.”252 In a 
                                                           
business can successfully survive, the solution is not to force innocent parties to 
continue to absorb those costs but to stop manufacturing . . . the product and 
develop a safer alternative.”); see also Klass, supra note 113, at 117–18 (stating: 
In the end, the message to take away from the cases is somewhat 
mixed. Liability verdicts against manufacturers can influence which 
products are on the market and what warnings accompany those 
products. Although manufacturers warn that valuable products will not 
be available to consumers at low costs . . . it is not difficult to posit 
that higher consumer costs may be a legitimate tradeoff for the removal 
of products that are harmful to children’s health and that quite possibly 
incur even larger and longer-term health-related costs to society.). 
248 Garrett, supra note 13, at 559. 
249 Klass, supra note 113, at 145. 
250 See Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2152 
(“A chief objective of this proposal is to induce corporations to engage in far 
more scientific research when it matters—not to win lawsuits but to protect 
society against the risks posed by their products.”). 
251 See, e.g. Garrett, supra note 13, at 530 (“With suspected toxins, moral 
concerns preclude conducting controlled tests on human subjects.”). 
252 Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 288. 
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sense, therefore, children become unknowing participants in 
informal experiments conducted by the pharmaceutical industry, 
which nevertheless produce results (i.e., case studies) that are 
usually deemed inadmissible by the courts when injuries arise. 
Some scholars have argued that courts should recognize the 
right of individuals to make an informed choice about whether or 
not to expose themselves to medications that may pose a risk to 
their health.253 To facilitate this patient right, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would be required to warn consumers about risks 
that are reasonably foreseeable.254 The focus would therefore shift 
away from the plaintiff’s burden in proving causation after an 
injury has occurred, and move toward informing consumers about 
the potential risks before the medication has been ingested.255 
There have been many tort actions alleging that drug 
manufacturers did not adequately warn consumers about the 
dangers associated with their products.256 For instance, the 
manufacturer of Parlodel257a drug taken by women after 
childbirth to suppress lactationdid not advise users about the 
risk of stroke associated with the drug or of the simple and 
possibly more effective alternative of ingesting aspirin. 
Subsequently, the drug was taken off the market by the FDA 
because the “possible risks outweigh[ed] the limited benefits.”258 
However, women who had suffered the catastrophic effects of the 
medication prior to its removal were left with little remedy because 
most courts found that plaintiffs could not meet Daubert standards 
regarding the causation issue.259 Certainly, these women would not 
                                                           
253 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 267–70 (explaining that courts 
have held drug manufacturers liable in products liability cases where they have 
“fail[ed] to provide adequate information about risks associated with a . . .  
drug,” but that such liability has been contingent upon proof of a “causal 
relationship between the uncertain risk and the plaintiff’s harm.”). 
254 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 267–68. 
255 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 267–68 
256 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 269–70. 
257 Sandoz/Novartis was the manufacturer of Parlodel. Berger & Twerski, 
supra note 10, at 269.   
258 Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11th Cir. 2002). 
259 In Rider, the plaintiff’s claims against the drug manufacturer were 
unsuccessful because United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
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have taken the medication in the first place if they had been warned 
of the dangers associated with the medication. 
Bendectin is another example of a dangerous drug about which 
users were not adequately warned.260 It was used from 1957 
through 1983 to treat morning sickness in expectant mothers, but 
the drug was taken off the shelves because of “widespread fears 
that it caused severe birth defects [including limb reduction] in the 
children whose mothers ingested the drug while pregnant.”261 When 
parents of children who were born with the birth defects brought a 
suit against the manufacturer of the drug, they relied upon a variety 
of evidence, including “in vitro . . . studies, in vivo . . . studies, 
chemical structure analyses, and retrospective epidemiological 
studies.”262 While some early plaintiffs were victorious, the 
majority of plaintiffs who brought claims against the manufacturer 
of Bendectin were unsuccessful because the evidence was deemed 
insufficient to establish a causal link.263 Perhaps a more equitable 
result would have been reached if the court had recognized an 
“informed choice” action because “[t]here is little doubt that the 
                                                           
determined that she could not meet Daubert standards on the issue of causation. 
295 F.3d 1194. 
260 See Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268–69. 
261 Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268 (citing MICHAEL D. GREEN, 
BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 91, 180 (1996)). 
262 Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268; see also Extension 
Toxicology Network, Epidemilogy, http://pmep.cce.cornell.edu/profiles/ 
extoxnet/TIB/epidemiology.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2007) (stating: 
Epidemiological studies can be divided into two basic types depending 
on (a) whether the events have already happened (retrospective) or (b) 
whether the events may happen in the future (prospective). The most 
common studies are the retrospective studies which are also called case-
control studies. A case-control study may begin when an outbreak of 
disease is noted and the causes of the disease are not known, or the 
disease is unusual within the population studied.). 
263 Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268 (citing DeLuca v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The district court held 
that [the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert in pediatric pharmacology] would be 
inadmissible at trial because it was not based on data of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the pertinent fields in issuing opinions on these subjects, as 
is required by Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”). 
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vast majority of expectant mothers suffering from the discomfort 
of morning sickness would have refused to take Bendectin to 
alleviate their discomfort if told that the drug carried with it an 
uncertain risk of birth defects to their fetuses.”264 
The right to make an informed choice is particularly important 
when the drugs are not necessary treatments, but rather, treat 
minor ailments, have “little therapeutic value,” or to which viable 
alternatives are available.265 When these situations occur in 
children’s medications, it is easy to understand that most parents 
would have chosen to give their children an alternative therapy or 
would have foregone treatment altogether had they been adequately 
warned of the possible dangers.266 Take, for instance, 
Phenylpropanolamine (“PPA”)—an ingredient that was found in 
many over-the-counter children’s cough/cold medications for 
decades.267 In recommending that PPA be taken off the market in 
2000, the FDA considered that medications containing PPA were 
used to treat run of the mill, non-life threatening illnesses for which 
there were many viable alternative treatments, as well as the severe 
risk of hemorrhagic stroke associated with use of the drug.268 
Certainly, if parents were given the choice between subjecting their 
child to a risk of hemorrhagic strokes or putting up with a runny 
nose, the choice would have been clear.269 Nonetheless, the 
manufacturers did not warn about the risks,270 and the total number 
                                                           
264 Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 269. 
265 Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268, 288. 
266 Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268. 
267 Drugs Containing PPA, supra note 185, at 3B. 
268 Hopper, supra note 189, at A41. Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A 
(Before the drug was removed from the market, the FDA had received 44 reports 
of hemorrhagic strokes following the ingestion of PPA, and “officials said . . . 
that the true number [wa]s probably much higher, due to underreporting.”). 
269 See, e.g., Sheba R. Wheeler, Pharmacies Yank Products With FDA-
Flagged Ingredient, DENV. POST, November 8, 2000, at B-01 (reporting that 
one customer, whose child was born just three days before the recall, indicated 
that he was not worried about the news reports indicating that many cold 
remedies and diet pills that contained phenylpropanolamine had been linked to 
an increased rate of stroke, “until he realized that some children’s medications 
might contain the problematic drug.”). 
270 See Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A (noting that the Consumer 
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of children who were adversely affected by PPA may never be 
known. 
Safety concerns about children’s cough and cold medications 
did not end when PPA-containing drugs were recalled.271 In 
October 2007, the manufacturers of many popular children’s 
medications withdrew their products from the market272 after the 
FDA recommended that they should not be used in children under 
age six.273 Before the voluntary recall by manufacturers, these 
medications were widely available274 even though their safety or 
efficacy had not been tested in pediatric populations.275 More 
disturbingly, after the FDA’s recommendations,276 some 
manufacturers of children’s medications have chosen to keep their 
products on the market.277 Perhaps if the courts recognized an 
informed choice cause of action that was not contingent upon proof 
of causation, manufacturers would be less willing to ignore the 
reported dangers. In the meantime, children will continue to be 
injured by medications that their parents may not have chosen to 
give them had they received the proper information beforehand.278 
                                                           
Healthcare Products Association stated: “[o]ur members stand behind PPA as 
safe and effective products when used according to label directions.”). 
271 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 1, at A18. 
272 Over-the-Counter Infant Cold Medications Recall Sparked by Safety 
Concerns, www.newsinferno.com/archives/1902 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
273 Hollis, supra note 2. 
274 Over-the-Counter Infant Cold Medications Recall Sparked by Safety 
Concerns, supra note 273 (“Prior to this recall, there were about 800 different 
over-the-counter cold medications sold in the U.S. for use in young children.”). 
275 Meadows, supra note 3, at 74; Over-the-Counter Infant Cold 
Medications Recall Sparked by Safety Concerns, supra note 273 (The FDA 
previously replied upon safety and dosing information that had been extrapolated 
from adult studies). 
276 McNeil Consumer Healthcare is Voluntarily Withdrawing Infants’ 
Cough and Cold Products, LAB BUSINESS WEEK, October 28, 2007, at 445. 
277 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at A1 (“Despite the industry’s 
recommendation, many companies—including such giants as Johnson & 
Johnson—continue to sell cough and cold medicines with ‘infant’ in their titles 
and pictures of babies on their labels.”). 
278 See Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 288. 
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CONCLUSION 
Adverse drug reactions are one of the leading causes of death in 
this country. Children are particularly at risk because ethical and 
economic barriers often prevent or discourage children’s 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from conducting adequate safety 
testing. The recent removal of many children’s cough and cold 
medications from pharmacy shelves has highlighted the risks that 
result from inadequate safety testing. Federal legislative measures 
aimed at increasing the amount of testing that is conducted on 
pediatric medications have produced only limited success. 
Therefore, new measures must be developed and implemented in 
order to protect children from this disturbing threat. 
The tort-system is well-suited for protecting children from the 
adverse effects of unsafe medications because it has the capacity to 
compensate victims, deter dangerous or negligent behavior by 
manufacturers, and spread losses amongst those who are in the best 
position to prevent them. However, narrow interpretations of 
Daubert evidentiary standards often result in the exclusion of non-
epidemiological evidence of causation, leaving child plaintiffs with 
an insurmountable burden on this critical element of their toxic tort 
claims. In this regard, defendant manufacturers actually benefit 
from their own negligent behavior. That is, their failure to conduct 
product safety tests insulates them from liability by depriving 
plaintiffs of the critical scientific evidence they need to bring a 
successful claim. Therefore, while the tort system has the potential 
to protect children from dangerous pharmaceuticals, it is doing the 
opposite. 
Legal scholars have proposed a variety of measures to help 
counteract the overwhelming challenges that plaintiffs face in 
bringing toxic tort claims, including new legislation, a broader range 
of admissible evidence, a lower causation burden, burden-shifting, 
and the implementation of the consumer’s right to make an 
informed choice. If implemented, these proposals would create 
incentives for manufacturers to conduct adequate safety testing on 
children’s medications or to keep such medications off the shelves 
altogether. Further, if manufacturers chose to follow neither of 
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these paths, they would face an increased likelihood of liability for 
the injuries caused by their products. As a result, the tort system 
would not only be better equipped to compensate children after 
they sustain injuries from dangerous medications, but also, and 
more importantly, to protect children from injuries before they 
ever occur. 
 
 
